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PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES,
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS. By Milton Heumann.* University of

Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. 1978. Pp. 219. Reviewed by Bernard
F. Goldbergt and F. Howard Silverstein.t
More will not be asked by those who have learned from
experience and history that government is at best a
makeshift, that the attainment of one good may involve the
sacrifice of others, and that compromise will be inevitable
until the coming of Utopia.'
A cursory reading of Professor Heumann's book may leave the
reader with the feeling that the author's intention is to present just
one more book in the long line of writings castigating the plea
bargaining system.2 The preface and introductory chapters apply
such terms as "expeditious but undesirable," "just a part of the
system," and "part of the criminal court bureaucracy," in describing
the plea bargaining system. But a closer reading of the material
belies such a hasty assumption and shows that the author intends to
illustrate the inevitable adaptation 3 of court personnel and its
officers to the criminal justice plea bargaining system for reasons
independent of these traditionally offered rationales.
With graphic illustrations, Professor Heumann sets out in the
early chapters the method by which he obtained his information. His
research approach, much in line with that employed for a doctoral
thesis, tends, however, to force the reader to search for the meat in
the book, and does little to illuminate the mechanics of the plea
bargaining system for those who actually participate in it. For
example, the author traces the post-recruitment period of new
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges in order to compare what
a novice believes about the criminal plea bargaining system with
what a seasoned veteran knows from experiences within the
system. Unfortunately, the techniques of plea bargaining as
addressed do little to illuminate the plea bargaining system for those
who have previously participated in it.

* Assistant professor of political science, University of Michigan.
t B.S., 1943, Loyola College; L.L.B., 1951, University of Baltimore; practicing
attorney and member of the Maryland Bar Association; Public Defender of
Howard and Carroll Counties from 1972-78.
t B.S., 1973, University of Maryland; J.D., 1976, University of Baltimore;
practicing attorney and member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bar
Associations; Assistant Public Defender of Howard County from 1976 to the
present.
1. Stewart Drygoods Company v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 557 (1935) ( Cardozo, J.).
2. The case of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), affirmatively resolved
the basic question of whether plea bargains are acceptable.
3. Professor Heumann defines adaptation as "the process in which a newcomer
learns and is taught about his role obligations, and the related process in which
he translates these obligations into a perspective on plea bargaining" (p. 2).
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The input received by Professor Heumann, and used in drawing
his conclusions, was taken from Connecticut's circuit courts (lower
trial courts) and superior courts (higher trial courts). The author
concentrated his study within only six of these courts, three each
frbm the circuit and superior court levels. He further subdivided each
set of three courts, restricting his study to two in urban areas and
one in a rural environment. This served as a form of "control,"
enabling him to compare high and low volume courts and the
prevalence of plea bargaining in them in order to see what influence
case volume has on the process. Evidently, the Connecticut court
system allowed him to sit in on plea negotiations between defense
attorneys and prosecutors, as well as on discussions with the local
judiciary. It was these sessions involving felony and misdemeanor
cases that provided the basis for Professor Heumann's attempt to
unravel the "mysteries" behind plea bargaining.
Although the reader may assume during the early chapters that
this is no more than a sociological study written more for the private
citizen interested in why plea negotiations exist at all than for those
actually engaged in the practice, this notion is soon dispelled. It
quickly becomes evident that Professor Heumann's intention is not
only to create a picture of plea negotiations as they exist today but
also to provide thought provoking insights for those who actually
participate in such negotiations. Each chapter begins with quoted
statements from prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, who
appear more than willing to share their outlook on plea bargaining
with the author.4 These statements, as well as bits of humor, tend to
lighten the heavy text, making it more palatable for the reader and
permitting those involved in the plea bargaining process to identify
readily with the study's participants.
The underlying question in the book is whether the voluminous
caseload and its attendant pressure on the court system is the
underlying reason for the existence of the plea bargaining process.
The author ultimately determines that, although this is the
prevailing rationale offered for plea bargaining, such a theory can
be deflated by examining high caseload and low caseload courts. His
examination of these two different areas surprisingly tends to
illustrate that the method and usage of plea negotiation is almost
identical no matter how large or small the caseload involved. This is
indeed a startling conclusion for it contradicts the commonly
supposed and tenerally unchallenged rationales for the existence of
plea bargaining. Professor Heumann's development of this issue
alone makes the book most worthwhile.

4. In all, the author conducted 71 interviews with defense attorneys, prosecutors,
and judges in the six courts selected for his study.
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Professor Heumann, however, takes us into an equally interesting aspect of plea bargaining, centering his focus on the people
involved in the negotiating process - the defense attorney, the
prosecutor, and the judge. The author seems almost apologetic and
entirely sympathetic toward these people when, as novices, they are
cast into a system for which there is no formal learning process, no
advance warning, and very little training.
In looking first at the novice defense attorney, Professor
Heumann finds an individual who expects to try many of his cases
and attributes the plea bargaining system to "poor motivation or
overworked court personnel." The novice assumes that a sizeable
percentage of his clients are innocent or that they have disputable
claims in their cases. A journey through the adaptative process of
experience and time, however, leaves the defense attorney, now
seasoned, with a totally different outlook on the criminal justice and
plea bargaining system. The defense attorney is taught to avoid
trial since there can be certain court-imposed sanctions on the
attorney who insists upon being an adversary. He is taught, or told,
that prosecutors' files may be closed to him if he continues to file
Bills of Particulars and Motions For Discovery, that certain
prosecutors may refuse to plea bargain if he files legal challenges,
and that the state will attempt to obtain much harsher sentences if
the defendant is convicted after trial.
Eventually, the defense attorney begins to presume that a plea
bargain will be obtained in every case, and only if that option fails
does a trial emerge as a possible approach. The "deals" often appear
excellent and irresistible. This leads Professor Heumann to contend
that much of what a defense attorney learns to adapt to in relation
to plea bargaining does not rest on a case pressure foundation, that
the properties of the cases themselves will have the same effect on
attorneys in high and low volume jurisdictions, and that there is
only a minimal variation in case resolution in high and low volume
courts.
Examination of the adaptation process for prosecutors leads to
results similar to those found in defense attorneys. The main
distinction is that the prosecutor finds that he has the power to force
the negotiation of cases as well as the responsibility to expedite
these negotiations. The experienced prosecutor also has learned that
he should not leave the sentencing to the judge after the trial, but
instead should resolve sentencing between himself and the defense
attorney in their plea bargaining sessions.
Finally, Professor Heumann examines what has happened to
the judge in the plea bargaining situation and what part the judge
plays in this phase of the criminal justice system. It becomes
apparent that neither the new judge nor the experienced judge is
preoccupied with developing justifications for plea bargaining, and,
in fact, is aware, almost from the outset, of the advantages of the
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plea bargaining system on the handling of case volume. This is in
contrast with the adaptation process for the prosecutor and defense
attorney as previously developed by Professor Heumann. The judge's
significance in the plea bargaining process rests basically upon his
power to upset a negotiator's position. This tends to confine
prosecutors and defense attorneys within certain parameters of plea
bargaining, and to set out boundaries enabling them to perceive
what the judicial officer will accept or reject. This acceptance or
rejection by the judge is a tacit acquiescene by the judiciary to plea
negotiating, and illustrates the willingness of the judiciary to
delegate these powers to prosecutors and to defense attorneys.
In concluding his book, Professor Heumann suggests that new
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys are not well prepared for
the plea bargaining aspects of the criminal justice system by their
law schools. Further, the author concludes that the plea bargaining
process is an inevitable part of the judicial system, and that the
excuse, or explanation, for plea bargaining as an-outgrowth of case
pressure is unfounded and that negotiations will exist no matter
what size the caseload. Plea bargaining is an intrinsic part of our
judicial system and has a very important role to fulfill. Professor
Heumann, therefore, concludes that additional plea bargaining
styles and negotiation methods should be considered rather than the
elimination of plea bargaining itself.5 These reforms could include
putting the entire plea-bargained deal on the record as soon as it is
negotiated, and resorting to arbitration in the resolution of some
criminal disputes. Nevertheless, it appears that the method of plea
negotiations now existing in our judicial system is one which will
exist for some time to come. The impetus to negotiate is always
present. It appears from our experiences in the criminal justice area
that as long as prosecutors find themselves in situations where their
witnesses are missing, evidence has been lost, the overall case is
weak, or there is a possibility of complete exoneration, they will be
willing to plea bargain. On the other hand, the defense attorney will
always attempt to plea bargain, provided his client has indicated
guilt or has such a past criminal record as to warrant entry into
negotiations.

5. He states that "reform policy ought not be geared towaxd the abolition of plea

bargaining. The reason: the abolition of plea bargaining is impossible. .

.

. [T]he

same time and resources should be used to consider how to reduce abuse within
the plea bargaining system" (p. 166).

